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The 2nd Canadian Division, which landed in France on 15 September 1915, had 
established an uncertain operational record by 
the summer of 1916. As part of the Canadian 
Corps, the division had spent virtually all of its 
time in or near Belgium’s notorious Ypres Salient, 
where it was embroiled in a grim campaign of 
trench warfare. Notable successes in trench 
raiding were offset by costly setbacks, such as the 
division’s failure to hold a series of mine craters 
at St. Eloi in April 1916. This was followed in 
June by the withdrawal of one of its brigades 
in the face of heavy enemy attacks at Hooge, 
which were part of the Germans’ ultimately 
unsuccessful effort to hold captured Canadian 
positions around Mount Sorrel. 
 Major-General  Richard Turner,  the 
commander of 2nd Canadian Division,  was 
himself under a cloud. His earlier performance 
as a brigade commander in 1st Canadian Division 
during the 2nd Battle of Ypres in 1915 was 
questionable at best, and his division’s inability 
to make sense of the bewildering topography at 
St. Eloi in 1916 raised serious questions about 
his suitability for high command. Turner retained 
command of the division largely through his 
personal connections with the Canadian Minister 
of Militia and Defence, Sir Sam Hughes.1 
 Redemption for 2nd Canadian Division, 
and to some degree, for Turner himself, would 
finally come with the division’s successful 
storming of the French village of Courcelette 
on 15 September 1916. This operation, which 
was part of the larger Somme offensive, was 
2nd Canadian Division’s first major victory of 
the First World War. Unfortunately, the glow of 
success would be obscured by heavy casualties 
and limited gains during the division’s frustrating 
second operational tour at the Somme in late 
September and early October. Nevertheless, the 
victory at Courcelette proved that the division 
could successfully organize and execute a major 
offensive operation. For Major-General Turner, 
the battle stood as a personal vindication, and, 
at least in his own mind, made up for past 
failures. 
The Battle of the Somme
While the Canadians recovered from their ordeal at Hooge and Mount Sorrel, the 
British Fourth Army, under General Sir Henry 
Rawlinson, assumed the lion’s share of the 
greatest offensive yet launched by the British 
Armies on the Western Front. This extended 
series of operations, known collectively as the 
Battle of the Somme, began on 1 July 1916 and 
would continue through to 18 November, when 
it finally bogged down in the autumn rain and 
mud. 
 Based upon the experiences of 1915, many 
British senior commanders, including the 
commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Sir Douglas 
Haig, believed that greater application of artillery 
power was the key to breaking the deadlock on 
the Western Front. After subjecting the German 
lines north of the Somme River to prolonged 
preliminary artillery bombardments, it was 
hoped that the attacking British infantry would 
be able to occupy the smoldering enemy positions 
with minimal fighting. Unfortunately, the frontage 
chosen for the offensive was too broad for the 
available artillery resources. The bombardment 
in support of the opening attack on 1 July was 
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too dissipated to achieve the desired destructive 
effect in most of the British sectors. As a result, 
defending German forces inflicted a staggering 
57,470 casualties on the British attackers. On the 
other hand, French divisions, cooperating with 
the British astride the Somme River, achieved 
greater success on 1 July, in part owing to heavier 
concentrations of artillery.2
 In spite of Field Marshal Haig’s ambitions, no 
breakthrough resulted during the first six weeks 
of fighting.3 On 19 August, Haig announced his 
intention “to deliver a strong attack about the 
middle of September using ‘fresh forces and 
all available resources.’”4 Although still licking 
its wounds from Mount Sorrel, the Canadian 
Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir 
Julian Byng, was relatively fresh in comparison 
with other formations. Consequently, its transfer 
from Belgium to the Somme battlefront in France 
began in late August.
Training for the Somme
On 28 August, the men of 2nd Canadian Division commenced training for the 
upcoming operations. The intensity and tempo 
of the fighting at the Somme would be unlike 
anything the Canadians had experienced. 
Training would help somewhat in preparing 
them, and the corps commander, Lieutenant-
General Byng, ensured that personal initiative 
was fostered during infantry training exercises. 
Casualties were simulated among the officers 
and senior NCOs, forcing junior NCOs and even 
private soldiers to assume leadership roles during 
practice attacks. This cultivation of leadership 
and personal initiative was an important feature 
of Canadian training and tactical doctrine, 
which would increasingly stress the importance 
of devolving tactical command and control to 
platoon and section leaders.5 
 Despite the value placed upon decentralization 
during training, Canadian infantry tactics at the 
Somme were not completely flexible. This had 
less to do with the continuing use of successive 
linear wave formations (which critics of British 
infantry tactics at the Somme have often dwelled 
upon) and more to do with the fact that the various 
types of infantry weapons (rifles, bayonets, hand 
grenades, rifle grenades, and Lewis guns) were 
not effectively coordinated. Some of them, 
such as the rifle grenade and the Lewis gun 
(an automatic rifle), tended to be employed 
in separate specialist sections organized and 
often controlled by battalion headquarters. This 
arrangement precluded efficient coordination 
of a battalion’s full range of firepower assets 
at platoon or section levels. Although many 
Canadians, in common with others among the 
Allied and German armies, already appreciated 
the value of small unit tactics during the fighting 
at the Somme, Canadian infantry platoons would 
not become truly effective fire-units in their own 
right until battalions were finally reorganized to 
incorporate all of the major infantry weapons 
within each platoon. This process would not 
begin until the end of 1916.6 
 Meanwhile, Major-General Turner’s men 
took advantage of what relatively little time 
they had for training before they were thrust 
into action at the Somme in September.7 Units 
practiced on training grounds that were taped 
off to represent enemy trenches. Manoeuvers 
Major-General Richard Turner was the commander of 
2nd Canadian Division. His generalship at the Battles 
of 2nd Ypres and the St. Eloi Craters had called into 
question his battlefield command abilities, but he was 
to prove his critics wrong at Courcelette.
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were carried out on successive scales, first with 
sections, then platoons and companies, followed 
by entire battalions and brigades.8 These practice 
attacks also introduced the men to the concept 
of advancing behind an artillery barrage, which 
on the training fields was “represented by men 
carrying flags, who moved in bounds on timed 
programmes to indicate the area on which the 
shells would fall.” Many of these simulation 
techniques had been used by British and 
Canadian troops in their rehearsals for assaults 
or trench raids before the Somme offensive.9
The Canadians Arrive at the Somme
On 30 August, the Canadian Corps began relieving I Anzac Corps around Pozières, 
and Lieutenant-General Byng assumed command 
of the sector on 3 September.10 The Canadians 
now joined General Sir Hubert Gough’s Reserve 
Army, which had taken over the northern portion 
of the Somme battlefront from General Sir Henry 
Rawlinson’s Fourth Army on 3 July. While the 1st 
Canadian Division held the entire corps front, the 
2nd Canadian Division prepared for its part in 
the upcoming attack, which would become known 
as the Battle of Flers-Courcelette. This battle was 
named for two villages which stood three miles 
apart and lay between Thiepval to the west and 
Morval to the east.11 The main thrust would be 
delivered by three corps of Rawlinson’s Fourth 
Army, whose objectives included the villages of 
Flers and Morval. To protect Rawlinson’s left 
flank, Gough’s Reserve Army would employ 
the Canadian Corps to attack the area around 
Courcelette and secure observation points over 
the strong German defences known as the Third 
Position. It was expected that the assault would 
be aided by two particular innovations: the use of 
a large-scale creeping artillery barrage, and the 
employment of an entirely new type of weapon 
– the tank.12 
 The Canadian Corps would advance with 
two divisions along a 2,200-yard front. The 2nd 
Canadian Division, occupying the right sector of 
the Canadian front, would deliver the main attack 
astride the Albert-Bapaume road. Major-General 
Turner’s men would have to traverse a swathe 
of German-held territory ranging in depth from 
1,000 yards on the right to around 400 yards on 
the left in order to gain their objectives south of 
the village of Courcelette. These included Candy 
Trench, the heavily fortified ruins of a sugar 
factory, and roughly 1,500 yards of Sugar Trench. 
Along the left sector, the 8th Infantry Brigade 
of Major-General Louis Lipsett’s 3rd Canadian 
Canadian soldiers test a Vickers machine gun prior to the Battle for Courcelette.
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Division would advance some 400 yards and 
provide flank protection.13 
 On the night of 10 September, 2nd Canadian 
Division entered the front lines, relieving two 
brigades of 1st Canadian Division. The following 
day, Turner submitted his division’s scheme of 
operations to Canadian Corps headquarters. 
Officers’ conferences were hastily convened to 
discuss arrangements, and last minute practice 
attacks were held.14 The task of planning had 
not been easy, given the Canadians’ relative 
inexperience in conducting large-scale offensive 
operations, and the formidable nature of the 
German positions. These consisted of a maze 
of trenches and earthworks integrating existing 
civilian structures, such as the Sugar Factory. This 
edifice, along with many of the intact buildings 
in Courcelette itself, was heavily fortified and 
bristled with machine guns. In addition, the 
village was honeycombed with cellars, dugouts, 
and galleries furnishing ample protection for 
large numbers of defending troops from the 45th 
Reserve Division of the Guard Reserve Corps.15 
 According to the plan, 2nd Canadian Division 
would attack on a two-brigade frontage, with 
Brigadier-General H.D.B. Ketchen’s 6th Brigade 
on the left and Brigadier-General R. Rennie’s 4th 
Brigade on the right.16 Ketchen assigned the 28th 
Battalion to the left flank of his brigade’s advance, 
while the 27th Battalion took the right flank. The 
31st Battalion would be in support and the 29th 
in brigade reserve. In the 4th Brigade, Rennie 
directed the 21st, 20th, and 18th Battalions to 
take up the left, center, and right sub-sections, 
respectively, with the 19th Battalion in support. 
In addition, the 24th Battalion was detached from 
5th Brigade, which was in divisional reserve, and 
temporarily placed under Rennie’s command for 
use as brigade reserve.17 
 In support of 2nd Canadian Division’s infantry 
would be an array of units and formations from 
within and outside the Canadian Corps. These 
included the 1st Canadian and 18th Divisional 
Artilleries, with one field brigade from the 
Lahore Divisional Artillery (for a total of 114 18-
pounders and 28 4.5-inch howitzers). The 3rd 
Canadian Division had left its divisional artillery 
in Flanders, as it was “still too green for battle.” 
Consequently, it was supported by the four field 
brigades of the 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, 
plus two brigades from the 48th Divisional 
Artillery (in all, 72 18-pounders and 20 4.5-
inch howitzers). The artillery resources alone 
were unprecedented in Canadian operations. 
Supporting the two Canadian divisions were a 
M
ap
 d
ra
w
n 
by
 M
ik
e 
B
ec
ht
ho
ld
 ©
20
07
4
Canadian Military History, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol16/iss2/4
31
total of 64 heavy and 234 field pieces.18 Additional 
support would be rendered by the 1st Canadian 
Motor Machine Gun Brigade, along with machine 
guns from the 4th, 6th, and 9th Canadian 
Machine Gun Companies.19 
 The attacking infantry battalions would 
advance in successive waves following “the first 
large-scale rolling barrage ever to be fired by 
Canadian gunners.” At zero hour, the 18-pounders 
would open fire with shrapnel on a line 50 yards 
short of the German front line trench. At zero 
plus one minute, the barrage would lift to the 
enemy front line trench and hold there for three 
minutes. After that, the barrage would begin lifts 
of 100 yards every three minutes until settling 
upon the infantry’s final objective. There it would 
stay for six minutes before moving on in three 
more lifts of three minutes each to the final 
barrage line between the villages of Courcelette 
and Martinpuich – a total of 3,000 yards from the 
infantry’s jumping-off trenches. At the same time, 
the howitzers would unleash stationary barrages 
upon the enemy’s rear areas.20 
 More novel and mobile fire support would 
come from the recently organized tank companies. 
In all, 49 operable tanks were available for the 
British operations on 15 September, and virtually 
all of them were allotted to the Fourth Army. 
Only seven tanks (from No.1 Section, Heavy 
Section, Machine Gun Corps) were assigned to 
the Reserve Army, all of which were slated to 
support 2nd Canadian Division. One of these 
seven tanks would be kept in reserve, leaving six 
to go into action – three tanks in support of each 
attacking infantry brigade.21 The left detachment 
of three tanks was ordered to proceed along 6th 
Brigade’s left flank in order to furnish cover and 
assist with mopping up. Once these tasks were 
accomplished, these three tanks were to swing 
east toward the rear of the Sugar Factory. The 
Brigadier-General H.D.B. Ketchen (seated), commander of 6th Brigade, with members of his staff.
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right detachment would advance along the Albert-
Bapaume Road and make straight for the Sugar 
Factory, providing close support for 4th Brigade’s 
infantry. When the infantry gained their final 
objectives, the tanks would move back to their 
assembly areas where they could be rearmed 
and refueled.22 
 Although the employment of tanks was 
the most innovative feature of the assault, the 
operational scheme did not revolve around them. 
Tanks were viewed mainly as adjuncts to the 
infantry. According to the operational orders, the 
tanks were to “conform to the infantry advance” 
by having them accompany the first waves of 
infantry. In fact, it was ordered that if the tanks 
proved unable to keep up with the infantry, then 
“the latter will not wait for them.”23 Moreover, 
the Canadian infantry did not have time to 
thoroughly train with the tanks that would be 
supporting them. The first tanks were shipped 
to France in mid-August, barely a month before 
their battlefield debut, and it was not until early 
September that a small training centre was set 
up near Abbeville for the newly-formed tank 
companies. This allowed tank crews little time 
to practice skills other than basic driving and 
gunnery. In short, before 15 September, there 
had been too little time available for tanks and 
infantry to train together.24 Yet the sheer novelty 
of the technology presented potential advantages, 
for even if the machines and tactics had yet to 
be perfected, it was hoped that their shock value 
might prove decisive.
The Battle of Courcelette
On the morning of 14 September, the day before the attack, 2nd Canadian Division 
issued Operation Order No.78. This order 
outlined the final instructions for the advance, 
proclaiming that, “The attack will be pushed with 
the utmost vigour until the objective is reached 
and every opportunity of exploiting success will 
be seized.”25 In the hours before the assault, 
jumping off trenches were dug in advance of 
the Canadian front lines, which allowed the 
troops to form up roughly 150 yards closer to 
the German positions. In 6th Brigade’s section, 
the German front line now lay between 100 and 
200 yards away.26 Based on previous operations 
at the Somme, it was felt that an attack should 
consist of “a short rush of 200 to 300 yards at 
most.” It was hoped that this would minimize 
casualties and decrease the risk of the attackers 
losing direction.27
 However, this initial short rush would carry 
the assaulting troops only to their first objective. 
Before the 4th and 6th Brigades could settle down 
to consolidate their gains, some battalions would 
have to advance their first waves roughly 1,000 
yards in order to reach their final objectives along 
Sugar and Candy Trenches. Furthermore, the 5th 
Brigade, in divisional reserve, was ordered to 
prepare “to move forward to and beyond the final 
objective,” if the opportunity arose, taking “every 
opportunity of exploiting the success.”28 The 
limited advances that had characterized British 
attacks between late July and early September 
were over. Field Marshal Haig now wanted a bold 
rush, through to the German Third Position at 
the outset of the September offensive. General 
Gough, the commander of the Reserve Army, 
and a cavalryman by training, was not favorably 
disposed to caution and was anxious to fulfill 
Haig’s vision.29 
 Many officers and other ranks remembered 
that 15 September marked the first anniversary 
of 2nd Canadian Division’s arrival in France. For 
J.F. McKay of the 28th Battalion, the date also 
had a more personal and ironic significance. “I 
always remember that [date],” he said, “because 
back in Saskatchewan…all my life I’d been getting 
up early on the 15th of September to go out duck 
shooting. This time I was going out for something 
quite different. I was one of the ducks…”30
 In the pre-dawn hours of 15 September, units 
of the 4th and 6th Brigades moved into their 
jumping-off positions.31 Periodic traffic jams in 
the communication trenches were made worse 
on the right portion of the 4th Brigade’s front 
around 0300 hours, when the Germans launched 
a sudden bombing attack supported by artillery. 
Through the determined efforts of detachments 
from the 18th, 19th, and 20th Battalions, the 
enemy assault parties were soon repulsed. 
Major-General Turner later remarked that if his 
men had failed to check this fierce attack, “the 
success of the whole planned advance might have 
been jeopardized.”32 With the Canadian assembly 
secured from this last minute threat, the leading 
waves of infantry settled down to wait.
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 Over the previous three days, British and 
Canadian heavy howitzers and siege guns 
pounded enemy positions, softening them up for 
the assault. Then at zero hour, 0620 hours, the 
field guns,
standing almost wheel to wheel in the Sausage 
and Mash Valleys joined in a tremendous 
drum-fire that burst from the mile upon mile 
of batteries of all calibres massed behind the 
battlefront. The ground of No Man’s Land 
trembled with the concussions and explosions 
of the rolling barrage.33
 Lance Cottermole of the 21st Battalion 
recalled that he never heard the officer’s whistle 
when the moment came to go over the top, for,
The air over our heads was suddenly filled with 
the coughing and sighing, whining and screaming 
of thousands of shells of all calibres, making it 
impossible to hear anything. We stood up and I 
looked around behind me; as far as the eye could 
see, from left to right, there was a sheet of flame 
from the hundreds of guns…belching fire and 
smoke. It was an awe-inspiring sight.34
 Amid the din, the men of 4th and 6th 
Brigades clambered out of their jumping-off 
trenches and lurched forward toward the enemy 
front line, screened by a moving curtain of fire 
and shrapnel. Most of the assaulting battalions 
advanced in five waves, employing one, and 
sometimes even two, intermediate waves 
(supplied by the supporting battalions), which 
served to mop up and consolidate the objectives. 
In a mere seven minutes from zero hour, most 
of the attackers from both brigades secured the 
German front line. The 4th Brigade encountered 
little opposition, but the 6th Brigade faced stiffer 
resistance, particularly on its left, which was 
overcome with bombs and bayonets.35
 Brigadier-General Ketchen reported the 
creeping barrage as “excellent,” with the “majority 
of the enemy dead” being “shot through the head.” 
Lieutenant-Colonel Elmer Jones of the 21st 
Battalion concurred. According to Jones, the 
artillery barrage “had thoroughly demolished” 
the German front line trench “and killed most 
Left: A heavy howitzer fires in support of the Canadians at Courcelette.  Right: Canadian artillerymen unload howitzer 
shells in anticipation of the upcoming battle, September 1916.
LAC PA 551Canadian  War Museum EO-0740
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of the occupants.”36 Unusually large numbers 
of dead and wounded Germans were found in 
the front and support lines, confirming that 
they had planned to follow up their pre-dawn 
bombing attack on 4th Brigade’s front with a 
full-scale assault. The waiting enemy troops, 
crowded into their forward trenches, were caught 
in the Canadian barrage and suffered huge 
losses. Yet within three minutes of zero hour, 
the German artillery laid down its own barrage, 
which caused “considerable casualties” among 
the Canadians. Although Allied counter battery 
techniques continued to evolve throughout the 
Somme campaign, they had not yet matured. 
Consequently, enough enemy batteries survived 
to inflict terrible damage upon the exposed 
Canadian infantry each time they advanced.37 
 In spite of the enemy barrage, both Canadian 
brigades moved onward through the German 
second line. Some units experienced little fighting 
and captured a number of dazed enemy survivors 
who were glad to escape the ordeal of the 
Allied bombardment. Other units encountered 
stubborn pockets of resistance that poured a 
galling enfilade fire into the attacking waves 
before being dispatched by the grenades and 
bayonets of the mopping-up parties.38 
 By 0700 hours the 4th Brigade reported 
that its final objectives along Candy and Sugar 
Trenches were taken, while the 6th Brigade 
reported likewise 40 minutes later.39 As predicted, 
the battle for the fortified Sugar Factory had been 
deadly. In anticipation of stiff opposition at this 
strong point, arrangements were made to bring 
down a concentrated bombardment of heavy 
artillery, which, according to Brigadier-General 
Rennie, “assisted materially in checking the 
enemy machine gun fire.” Employing the kind 
of initiative that was drilled into them on the 
training grounds, Rennie’s infantry assaulted 
the factory from three sides simultaneously as 
soon as the artillery bombardment lifted. At 6:55 
a.m., troops of the 21st Battalion forced their 
way into the Sugar Factory and captured around 
125 survivors from its garrison.40 The attack 
on the morning of 15 September may not have 
exhibited the finesse in small unit tactics that the 
Canadians would display in 1917 and 1918, but 
the makings of them already were evident.
 As the morning wore on, the mopping-up 
parties continued their grim work, often lobbing 
grenades down dugout shafts when their German 
occupants refused to vacate. By afternoon, both 
attacking brigades set many of their remaining 
able-bodied men to work assisting engineer 
and pioneer units in consolidating the captured 
The artillery barrage which preceded the Canadian attack 
on 15 September caught a large number of German 
soldiers in their forward trenches as they prepared for an 
attack of their own.
Canadian  War Museum EO-0772
Canadian  War Museum EO-0775
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ground. Other troops formed offensive patrols 
and pushed forward to establish advance posts 
and strong points, relying heavily upon Lewis 
gun teams. Positions were occupied just south 
of Courcelette and along a sunken road (named 
“Gun Pit Road”) linking Courcelette with the 
neighboring village of Martinpuich. Around 0900 
hours, members of the 31st Battalion managed to 
work their way into the outskirts of Courcelette 
itself, and sent word that the village was “fairly 
clear of the enemy.”41 
 Even though it had not achieved complete 
destruction, the supporting artillery had 
destroyed or suppressed the German defenders 
sufficiently that the Canadians were able to 
maintain their forward momentum. Brigadier-
General Rennie reported that prisoners taken 
near the Sugar Factory declared that they were 
completely surprised by the Canadian attack, 
“and the Officers did not hesitate to express 
their admiration for the irresistible advance of 
our Infantry and their own helplessness in [the] 
face of our bombardment.” Despite heavy losses, 
especially among the first waves, many Canadian 
junior officers and other ranks rose to the 
occasion and took charge of those around them. 
Rennie stated that although the 21st Battalion 
had suffered heavy losses among its officers, most 
of the companies carried on successfully under 
the command of subalterns, while many platoons 
continued to function under the leadership of 
the NCOs, and, in some instances, of private 
soldiers.42 
 But for many historians, it is the action 
of the tanks on 15 September that remains a 
principal point of interest, for such weapons had 
never been used in combat before. The six tanks 
supporting 2nd Canadian Division’s attack at 
Courcelette had begun lumbering forward from 
their assembly positions at zero hour. Yet all but 
two soon were knocked out of action.43 Of the 
two machines that did engage the enemy, some 
anecdotal accounts have made great claims for 
their impact. Gordon Scott of the 6th Brigade 
Scout Section went over the top and soon was 
forced to seek shelter in a shell hole, owing to 
the “terrific machine gun fire” along the left flank. 
Knowing that “it was sure death to expose one’s 
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head,” the situation appeared grim, until the only 
operable tank supporting the 6th Brigade arrived 
on the scene: 
It was at about this time that the first tank 
appeared behind us, guided by a foot soldier who 
miraculously escaped a rain of fire now diverted 
from us toward the new arrival. In fact, all of 
us rose from the holes and stood, unharmed, 
watching in amazement. On it came, a dragon 
spouting fire in all directions. The ground 
was pitted with thousands of shell holes, but 
the dragon dipped and rose and just came on 
relentlessly until it stood astride the trench.
Some of the Germans fled but most of them 
stood rooted to the spot on which they stood, 
hands held high in surrender. We casually took 
over the trench and then proceeded on down 
the hill in the wake of our good friend. The tank 
then moved across to the sugar factory, which 
was resisting a very vigorous attack. Walls and 
emplacements were pushed aside or mounted 
and this redoubt was speedily reduced.44
A similar tale was told by Magnus MacIntyre 
Hood of the 24th Battalion. Hood served in a 
carrying party bringing up ammunition to the 
21st Battalion, and he witnessed the arrival of 
the single tank remaining in active support of the 
4th Brigade. According to Hood, “As we reached 
them [the 21st Battalion] we saw a Landship, 
named the L.S. Crème de Menthe, pass ahead 
and go right up to the walls of the [sugar] refinery, 
Top right: Canadian soldiers stand beside a destroyed 
tank on the Somme battlefield.
Centre right: A view of the Sugar Refinery after the battle 
looking from the north. The telegraph poles mark the 
position of the Albert-Baupaume road.
Right: Another view of the Sugar Refinery.
Below: This photo, taken from the Canadian start line, 
shows the Sugar Refinery under an artillery bombardment 
during the battle on 15 September 1916.
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This air photo, taken on 15 September 1916, shows the shell-scarred battlefield surround the Sugar 
Refinery (centre). The Albert-Bapaume road cuts across the bottom of the photo, Sugar Trench across 
the top, while Candy Trench passes behind the Sugar Refinery to link the main road to Sugar Trench.
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its guns blazing. It seemed to lean against one of 
the walls which collapsed and the monster tore 
into the fort, while we could see the Germans 
streaming out behind it offering an excellent 
target to the riflemen in the shell holes.”45
 These accounts make it appear as though 
the two tanks were instrumental in the capture 
of the Sugar Factory. However, according to 
Brigadier-General Rennie’s after-action report, 
the tank supporting his brigade arrived in the 
vicinity of the Sugar Factory around 0750 hours 
– almost a full hour after the 21st Battalion had 
captured the factory. Nor did Lieutenant-Colonel 
Elmer Jones of the 21st Battalion mention tank 
support in his report on the capture of the Sugar 
Factory. Instead, Jones ascribed the successful 
storming of the factory to the accuracy of the 
artillery bombardment and the “great vigor” of his 
infantrymen. Both Jones and Rennie also noted 
the valuable assistance rendered by the 27th 
Battalion in silencing enemy machine gunners in 
a trench situated half way between the jumping-
off line and the Sugar Factory.46
 Even the tank crews themselves did not claim 
that they played a key role in the capture of the 
Sugar Factory. One of the tank officers, Captain 
A.M. Inglis (commanding Tank No.721, C.5) 
reported that at 0620 hours,
we commenced our advance and made for the 
Sugar Factory, which was my objective. Soon 
after crossing our front line trench a group of 
about 50 Germans came up towards the tank 
to surrender. Our infantry was well in advance 
of the tank, and were in the Sugar Factory by 
the time I arrived; but I was able to make use of 
my Hotchkiss Guns. I skirted the southern and 
eastern side of the factory and went up to the 
trench where our infantry were consolidating. 
Having found an officer who informed me that 
the position had been made good, I commenced 
my return journey…47
In reconciling Magnus MacIntyre Hood’s account 
with such reports, it is worth remembering that 
Hood’s duties in a carrying party would have 
placed him on the scene at the Sugar Factory 
much later than the men of the 21st Battalion. 
Perhaps he misinterpreted some mopping-up 
work by the tank as being the actual capture of 
the factory. By way of contrast, it is worth noting 
the opinion of one 21st Battalion veteran, who 
argued that the tanks “were a fluke; they didn’t 
amount to anything. They didn’t go very far…they 
bogged down. They got caught in the old trenches, 
you know, and they tipped over….they weren’t a 
success.”48 
 Overall, the tanks played a limited part 
in 2nd Canadian Division’s operations. They 
assisted some troops who were pinned down, 
such as Gordon Scott, by drawing enemy fire and 
intimidating groups of Germans who were still 
resisting. In the end, personal opinion of the tanks’ 
effectiveness depended upon one’s proximity to 
either of the two machines that did advance, and 
upon the circumstances that one was in at the 
time. Many Germans that found themselves in 
the tanks’ paths were suitably impressed, and 
some were clearly terrified. Despite their slow 
speed, the tanks could still inflict damage with 
their guns. “Oh a lot got bogged down of course,” 
said Sid Smith of the 18th Battalion, “but they 
still had their fire power and…one thing they 
did have was the matter of putting the wind up 
the enemy…Heinies ran like hell when they saw 
them coming.”49 Many accounts of the fighting at 
Courcelette repeated the opinion of some German 
prisoners that the use of tanks “was not war but 
bloody butchery.”50
 In a post-battle report to Lieutenant-General 
Byng on the efficacy of the tanks, Major-General 
Turner pronounced that “mopping up will, 
in future, be the chief role of these engines.” 
Byng was even more skeptical of their value, 
declaring that, “No action of the infantry should 
ever be made subservient to that of the tanks. 
Tanks are a useful accessory to the infantry, but 
nothing more.”51 While the tank experiment on 
15 September did not result in a spectacular 
success, lessons were learned that influenced 
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future technical and tactical developments. By 
1917 and 1918, tanks would become an integral 
part of Allied offensive strategy.52 
Capturing the Village
Notwithstanding the lackluster performance of the tanks, 2nd Canadian Division had 
done well for itself. But there was no time for 
Major-General Turner to rest upon his newfound 
laurels. With reports streaming in from Canadian 
patrols regarding the relative disorganization of 
remaining German defences, Lieutenant-General 
Byng decided at 1110 hours that the situation 
looked favorable enough to permit the capture 
of Courcelette itself. After receiving assurances 
that all infantry and artillery units would be ready 
by early evening, Byng informed Turner at 1315 
hours that zero hour for the next phase of the 
advance would be at 1800 hours. Anticipating 
this turn of events, Turner already had instructed 
Brigadier-General A.H. Macdonell’s 5th Brigade, 
then in divisional reserve, to begin preparing for 
just such an endeavour.53 
 Throughout the morning, Macdonell had kept 
his finger on the pulse of events, having situated 
himself at divisional headquarters where he 
relayed intelligence forward to his own brigade 
headquarters. His staff and senior officers were 
well apprised of the situation when, at Turner’s 
behest, Macdonell hurriedly convened a meeting 
of his four battalion commanders shortly after 
1300 hours to plan the capture of Courcelette. The 
22nd, 25th, and 26th Battalions were detailed to 
make the assault, while the 24th Battalion, which 
had functioned as the 4th Brigade’s reserve unit, 
was again placed in this capacity upon reverting 
to Macdonell’s command later that afternoon. 
Flank protection on the left would be provided 
by 3rd Canadian Division.54
 There was time for the battalion commanders 
and their officers to make only a quick visual 
reconnaissance of the ground they would 
have to cover, which was considerable. From 
their starting point they would have to cross 
approximately two miles in broad daylight before 
reaching their objectives along the northern 
and eastern outskirts of Courcelette.55 Time 
did not permit the construction of jumping-off 
trenches, nor did it allow for more methodical 
planning. Brigadier-General Macdonell simply 
explained to his battalion commanders the exact 
dispositions for the attack and the duties of each 
battalion.56 
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This photo of Courcelette being shelled was taken from the northeast corner of the Sugar Refinery during the afternoon 
of 15 September 1916 and shows the ground that had to be covered by the 22nd and 25th Battalions during their attack 
on the village.
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 It was decided that the battalions would form 
up on the reverse side of a slight slope in order 
to screen their movements from the enemy for 
as long as possible. By 1700 hours, all units 
were ready and began their advance. The 22nd 
Battalion deployed on the right in three long 
waves, and the 25th Battalion formed up on the 
left in four waves. The 22nd Battalion would 
maintain this formation during the attack, while 
the 25th Battalion would reform into two longer 
waves upon reaching the barrage line just before 
zero hour. The 26th Battalion advanced 150 
yards to the rear, with two companies deployed 
in support of each of the two leading battalions.57 
The troops moved off well before Byng’s stated 
zero hour of 1800 hours because they had a 
great deal of ground to cover before reaching the 
forward positions of the 4th and 6th Brigades. 
After moving through these positions, Macdonell’s 
men would form up behind a creeping barrage, 
scheduled to begin at zero hour, which would 
precede them through Courcelette and lead them 
to their objectives on the far side of the village. 
 Unfortunately, as soon as the 5th Brigade 
began its march toward the new Canadian front 
line, the Germans unleashed a creeping barrage 
of their own, which dogged them mercilessly 
throughout the entire advance.58 Amid the din 
and confusion of the enemy barrage, battalion 
scouts used compasses to help keep their 
comrades on track, while officers trudged on 
with maps in hand, carefully noting surviving 
landmarks. All ranks observed the position of 
the sun, which was over their left shoulders, and 
used it as a general guide along their northerly 
march route. Eventually, they passed through the 
foremost Canadian positions and reached their 
own barrage line in time for zero hour. The first 
lift was scheduled for 1815 hours giving all ranks 
a much-needed, albeit brief, rest before the final 
push into Courcelette. Units were halted as close 
to the barrage as possible, and officers used the 
few minutes remaining to reform their men.59 
 When the barrage began rolling forward, the 
three battalions resumed their advance, with the 
central street running north through the center 
of Courcelette forming the boundary between the 
22nd and 25th Battalions. As they proceeded 
through the blasted remains of the village, they 
at last came to grips with German troops from 
the 210th and 211th Reserve Regiments of the 
45th Reserve Division. The fighting was swift 
and brutal. The 22nd Battalion managed to push 
through to its objective by 1845 hours, following 
“a sharp fight of ten minutes during which the 
bayonet was frequently used.” To the left of 
the French Canadians, the Nova Scotians and 
other Maritimers in the 25th Battalion reached 
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A Canadian staff officer examines a smashed German field gun captured in Courcelette.
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their objective even earlier, at 1825 hours after 
crossing bayonets with the Germans in a deadly 
five-minute struggle.60
 However, not every member of the enemy 
garrison was so aggressive in defence. Gordon 
Silliker of “D” Company, 25th Battalion, was not 
impressed with the martial spirit of the German 
troops that he encountered as he fought his way 
through Courcelette:
We went into the village with one big rush which 
frightened all the Huns to death – the ones the 
artillery left. They nearly all surrendered, most 
of them meeting us with their hands up calling 
‘Mercy Kamerade’…Our company got about a 
hundred officers and men.
There is not much fight in the Germans. They 
are all right if they can get in some safe place 
where you cannot see them and they can snipe at 
you or put a machine gun on you…It’s a different 
tune they have when you get them on the point 
of the bayonet and especially when they get 
up against a Canadian. Whenever they see the 
Canadians coming they as a rule meet them with 
their hands up.61
 Bayonet work was prominent in both the 
morning and evening attacks at Courcelette. 
Musketry was employed frequently as well,62 
especially against groups of fleeing Germans. 
The 5th Brigade reported that upon entering 
Courcelette, “our troops saw many Bosches 
‘scuppering’ away over the ridge, many of whom 
were killed by our deliberate rifle fire and in 
some cases, sections had a splendid opportunity 
of making effective use of section fire control, the 
whole section coming into action as a fire unit 
on the fleeing enemy.”63 Although the habits of 
trench warfare led troops on both sides to favor 
grenades over rifles and bayonets, the Canadians’ 
use of musketry at Courcelette displayed 
their willingness to utilize rifles as weapons of 
opportunity.
The aftermath of the battle:– (from the top down)
The bodies of Canadian solidiers killed during the initial 
attack lay in no-man’s-land in front of Canadian lines.
Wounded Canadian soldiers are taken care of my medical 
personnel in a forward trench.
German soldiers received medical attention before being 
sent behind the lines into captivity.
The war is over for this group of German soldiers captured 
during the fighting for Courcelette.
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 While the 22nd and 25th Battalions made good 
their new positions 300 yards to the north and 
northeast of Courcelette, the 26th Battalion began 
mopping up the village. Although the artillery had 
obliterated many of the buildings, there still were 
plenty of dugouts and cellars in which German 
troops could hold out. These had to be cleared 
one by one, and this arduous task took the best 
part of two days to complete. Mopping-up and 
securing prisoners were important tasks, for 
it was said that unguarded German stragglers 
sometimes picked up weapons and fired into the 
backs of the troops who had initially accepted 
their surrender.64 The Germans reportedly 
employed other ruses as well. For instance, 
during the morning attack on 15 September, 
a party of Germans approached Captain B.M. 
Loghrin of the 18th Battalion with the apparent 
intention of surrendering. When Loghrin stepped 
forward to accept their surrender, one of the 
Germans hurled a grenade that killed the Captain 
instantly. According to Brigadier-General Rennie, 
“This foul act of treachery was observed by the 
men of his Company, with the result that none 
of the occupants of the trench were allowed to 
escape alive.”65 
 In some instances the Canadian troops were 
not angels either. Through a mixture of motives, 
including revenge, fears of German treachery, and 
possible official encouragement, some Canadians 
refused to take prisoners on 15 September. Many 
men in 2nd Canadian Division saw the attack 
as a chance to settle old scores with “Fritz” for 
the punishments inflicted upon them at St. Eloi, 
Hooge, and in other smaller deadly encounters. 
According to Brigadier-General Ketchen, “An 
officer of the 3rd Canadian Division, who was 
watching our advance from his position on our 
left, stated that the bayonet work of our Battalions 
was really magnificent. No wonder; these men 
had been cooped up in the Ypres Salient for 
many months and were getting a little of their 
own back.”66 When one member of the 28th 
Battalion was questioned about the scarcity of 
prisoners taken by his unit, he spat back the 
reply, “We’re not taking any. They blew mines 
under us twice.”67 Many troops in the 4th Brigade 
were equally uncharitable. “On our advancing,” 
Lieutenant-Colonel E.W. Jones admitted, “some of 
the enemy offered to surrender but in most cases 
these men were bayonetted by our advancing 
troops.”68 Major-General Turner was well aware 
of the pent-up hostility in his division, admitting 
in his diary that, “The men were not looking for 
prisoners, and considered a dead German was 
the best.”69
 There is some suggestion that it may have 
been official policy to take few prisoners on 15 
September, and that this policy resulted directly 
from fears of German deceit. Lance Cottermole 
of the 21st Battalion claimed that he and his 
comrades, 
were given strict instructions to take NO 
prisoners until our objectives had been gained. 
The reason for this was that so often in British 
advances, when the Germans had thrown down 
their arms in surrender and our men had moved 
through them, at the same time indicating to 
them to go to our rear where they would be 
collected as prisoners, the Germans had picked 
up their rifles again and shot our men in the 
back, thereby bringing the advance to a halt. 
No such risks could or would be taken in this 
important attack, and orders were reluctantly 
carried out.70 
During the battle, as Cottermole and his 
comrades in the battalion’s third wave busied 
themselves mopping up some enemy positions, 
he observed,
One young German, scruffy, bareheaded, cropped 
hair, and wearing steel-rimmed spectacles, [who] 
ran, screaming with fear, dodging in and out 
amongst us to avoid being shot, crying out ‘Nein! 
Nein!’ He pulled out from his breast pocket 
a handful of photographs and tried to show 
them to us (I suppose they were of his wife and 
children) in an effort to gain our sympathy. It 
was all of no avail. As the bullets smacked into 
him he fell to the ground motionless, the pathetic 
little photographs fluttering down to the earth 
around him.71 
So far, evidence of instructions to take no 
prisoners has not been found in official orders. 
But the exhortation in the divisional operation 
orders on 14 September to push the attack 
“with the utmost vigour until the objective is 
reached,” may have provided some subordinate 
commanders with justification for encouraging, 
or even ordering, their men to act ruthlessly. 
 Nevertheless, 2nd Canadian Division did 
collect significant numbers of German prisoners 
between 15 and 17 September. Brigadier-
General Macdonell reported approximately 
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1,055 prisoners captured by 5th Brigade, and 
Brigadier-General Ketchen reported that 6th 
Brigade took around 350 prisoners. Brigadier-
General Rennie did not supply an exact figure, but 
4th Brigade’s captures likely were comparable to 
6th Brigade’s.72 Prisoners were sent to brigade 
headquarters, and parties of Canadian Corps 
Cyclists escorted them farther back to the Corps 
Cage in Albert.73
 By 1935 hours on 15 September, Major-
General Turner received confirmation through 
verbal reports and aerial contact patrols74 that the 
“whole of Courcelette had been taken.” At 1950 
hours he sent “his heartiest congratulations” to 
all ranks for the day’s accomplishments.75 The 
division also received accolades from General 
Gough and Field Marshal Haig. Gough was 
especially impressed with the 5th Brigade’s 
performance, pointing out that their attack 
“across the open without any jumping-off place 
in the nature of trenches is without parallel in the 
history of the present campaign.” He requested 
that Brigadier-General Macdonell submit a report 
on the brigade’s advance, including details on the 
formations employed by his battalions.76
 Haig also was quite pleased with the day’s 
achievements. “The result of the fighting of 
the 15th of September and following days,” 
he enthusiastically declared, “was a gain more 
considerable than any which had attended our 
arms in the course of a single operation since the 
commencement of the offensive.”77 In his personal 
diary he noted also that, “The two Canadian 
[Brigades] which took the Sugar Factory and 
joining trenches were those which were said to 
have failed at St.Eloi in the spring. Sent a word 
of thanks and congratulation to them.”78
 This shows that Haig had not forgotten the 
debacle at St. Eloi, and Turner and his brigadiers 
must have been acutely aware of the scrutiny they 
were under. The effect this had on the behavior 
of numerous senior officers was readily apparent 
to subordinates like Captain Andrew Macphail, 
who observed that, “many officers commanding 
are like children at school. They wish to avoid a 
‘black mark’ or a ‘rap over the knuckles’; these 
are their favourite words.”79 
 At last the spectre of failure at St. Eloi 
departed from Turner and 2nd Canadian 
Division, and the “black mark” that had lain 
upon their reputations was largely, if not totally, 
erased. They had proved to their superiors, to 
their peers in other formations, and to the enemy 
that they were capable of planning and executing 
a successful large-scale offensive operation. In his 
personal diary on 17 September, Turner revealed 
his deep personal satisfaction. “We have had a 
great success,” he concluded, 
the greatest of any Division since these operations 
started…For 12 months I have waited with the 
Division for this opportunity. God knows they 
acted in a magnificent way – nothing, “losses” or 
anything else could stop them – they were out to 
even old scores of the Ypres Salient. From the 
Commander-in-Chief down – all are pleased.”80
 As the days passed, Turner grew even bolder 
in trumpeting the achievements of his division, as 
shown by a letter that he sent to Sir Max Aitken, 
complete with laudatory newspaper clippings 
about the success at Courcelette. “The attached 
clippings,” Turner advised Aitken, “have further 
reference to the success of this division.”81 
Turner’s emphasis of the word this in his letter 
reveals how sensitive he was about his division’s 
reputation – a reputation that, by extension, 
reflected upon his own. He also refused to share 
much credit for the capture of Courcelette with 
the British tanks that had supported his infantry 
and garnered a great deal of publicity, despite 
their limited role. On 22 September, he declared 
that, “Too much credit must not be placed on the 
tanks yet – Courcelette was won by my infantry.”82 
Turner was correct in downplaying the role of 
the tanks, but he did insufficient justice to the 
artillery’s role. Without overwhelming artillery 
support, his infantry would have sustained 
heavier losses than they did, and would not have 
captured their objectives as quickly as they did 
– if they captured them at all.
 Even with heavy artillery support, the 
operation still cost 2nd Canadian Division dearly. 
In taking Courcelette, its infantry battalions 
suffered 1,283 casualties (79 officers and 1,204 
other ranks) on 15 September alone. Of these, 
36 officers and 678 other ranks were killed.83 
The carnage of the fighting and the heavy losses 
on both sides left many men shaken. Lieutenant-
Colonel T.L. Tremblay of the 22nd Battalion 
remarked that, “If hell is as bad as what I have 
seen at Courcelette, I would not wish my worst 
enemy to go there.”84 Yet discipline in the division’s 
units remained substantially intact in the weeks 
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immediately following the village’s capture. 
On 1 October, the divisional Assistant Provost 
Marshal, Major A.M. Jarvis, declared that, “the 
general standard of conduct and discipline was 
never higher. The men though lively and sober 
are exceptionally well behaved and are bearing 
unusual hardships and fatigue with marvelous 
spirit. To lead such men is a glory – an honour 
without price.”85
 If 2nd Canadian Division’s time at the Somme 
was limited to its hard-fought victory on 15 
September, then the division’s experience in this 
campaign, although costly in terms of lives, might 
have had a more positive and lasting impact on 
the formation’s collective self-image. Certainly, 
personnel at all levels, from Major-General 
Turner and his staff down to the ordinary rank 
and file, had proved their capacity to mount a 
successful attack on a divisional scale. 
 However, the fighting that continued during 
the rest of September and early October quickly 
sapped whatever positive energy Turner and 
his men derived from their initial advance. 
2nd Canadian Division managed to beat off 
heavy German counterattacks at Courcelette, 
and although it performed no worse than other 
divisions during successive operations at Thiepval 
Ridge and the Ancre Heights, it was too worn out 
to capture such formidable objectives as Regina 
Trench. By the time it departed the Somme on 10 
October, 2nd Canadian Division would suffer a 
total of 6,817 casualties (286 officers and 6,531 
other ranks) in two bloody tours of duty.86 The 
capture of Courcelette was overshadowed by less 
conclusive subsequent battles, and by the overall 
dismal reputation that the Somme campaign 
gained. As a result, the battle remains largely 
forgotten in popular memory. Yet, when viewed 
in hindsight, the operation is an impressive 
achievement despite its horrors, and serves as 
a harbinger of greater victories to come in 1917 
and 1918.
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